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Assumed Risk as a Defense
Leon Green*
The concept of assumed risk is more fundamental than the
phrases used in its doctrinal formulation indicate. In fact it
is so broad and fundamental that it must be broken down into
a group of doctrines which more pointedly focus the factual
defenses on which a defendant may rely in a particular case.
It may be put this way. In any tort case for which a defendant
is called to account there may be many risks which result at
least in part from his conduct. The objective of the judicial
process is seldom if ever to impose all such risks upon the de-
fendant, but only those that fall within the ambit of the law's
protection. To this end the inquiry is sharpened by asking what
was the defendant's duty and what risks are included within its
scope? The scope of the defendant's duty marks the extent of
his liability. All the risks that fall outside his duty fall on the
victim, unless some other defendant can be found. Where the
defendant's duty ends, the assumption of risks by the victim
begins. In this sense assumption of risks is but the negative of
duty.
Duty and its scope are of course but conclusions reached
after consideration of the various factors and policies which
determine liability. This is sometimes called a weighing and
balancing of interests. Whatever it may be called it is the law
making or law determination function of the judicial process.
It is apparent that to call all the risks that fall without the
scope of a defendant's duty "assumed risks" is to include in
that term a hodge-podge of many considerations. If all liability
could be determined by an affirmative approach of marking out
the boundaries of a defendant's duty, it would not be necessary
to bother with those that fall without. In many cases however
it is desirable and of great value to approach the liability of a
defendant from a negative point of view, i.e., what risks should
not fall upon him but should be excluded.
In an adversary system of adjudication where arguments
are so vital to the respective parties, a defendant must have
argumentative doctrinal support to meet those of the plaintiff.
*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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It is thus that the risks which a defendant seeks to avoid must
be classified and given names. They are too bulky to deal with
under the generic name of "assumed risks." They have come to
be designated by specific doctrines which indicate limitations
on a defendant's duty. The most usual of these doctrinal de-
fenses are known as accident, act of God, no violation of duty,
contributory negligence, proximate cause and its progeny, plus
a possible residuary doctrine of "assumed risk," and numerous
refinements that need not be catalogued here. They all repre-
sent risks assumed by the victim. It can be readily understood
why it is difficult to maintain clear lines between these doctrinal
categories when each may have a different content of meaning
in different types of cases. Their easy convertibility into one
another is a source of great frustration to those who insist upon
doctrinal integrity.
Let it be emphasized that each of these defensive doctrines
is a variable or inconstant and highly ambiguous and each is
given meaning by the factual content of the particular case and
its environment. The assumption of risk doctrine as a residuary
doctrine of the group takes on many colorations and any authori-
tative formula for making use of it will be helpful only so long
as it does not impinge on the freedom of a court to evaluate the
factual and environmental data of the particular case to the end
that the risk involved can be allocated to the one party or the
other with a maximum of justice.
The residuary category of assumed risk is not clarified by
being tied too closely with "consent," "voluntary," "knowledge,"
and "appreciation."' Each of these terms is also a variable, in-
constant and unstable, meaningful only in the light of the factual
and environmental context of the particular case, and can only
frustrate judgment if given or attempted to be given a stable
or static content of meaning. It is not here suggested that this
easy convertibility of doctrine and the instability of its vocabu-
lary are disadvantageous, or are to be condemned. On the con-
trary, the inability to achieve a uniformity of terminology and
usage may well be the very factors in the judicial process that
insures the freedom of a court to reach a just or at least an
acceptable result in the particular case.
1. See PROSSER, TORTS 303-314 (2d ed. 1955) "Knowledge of the risk is the
watchword of assumption of risk." (id. at 309); Keeton, Assumption of Risk
and the Landowner, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 562 (1942).
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An examination of some of the classes of cases in which the
assumed risk defense has played an important role will reinforce
some of the foregoing observations.
INTENDED HARMS
In the area of intended physical contacts with the person
the consent of the injured person is frequently though not always
held to be a defense. This is true in fights, games, sexual of-
fenses, surgical operations, and medical treatments. It is horn-
book law that consent has a wide variation of meaning in these
cases and courts do not always agree as to its availability as a
defense. In the fight cases, mutuality is an inference drawn
from the victim's conduct and even where obvious some courts
refuse to recognize it as a defense.2 In the abortion cases there
is an equally wide division.3 In the play cases 4 many factors
qualify consent, while in the surgical cases the patient's consent
may be absent altogether, 5 or may be strictly guarded.6 In the
more serious treatments the doctor is under a heavy duty to
bring home to the patient the risks involved, even though the
patient knows the treatment is hazardous and perhaps experi-
mental.7 In all these cases consent is a much narrower and more
easily administered defense than in types of cases in which the
physical contacts are unintended. Moreover, in these cases con-
sent where recognized as a defense is merely the boundary line
of the defendant's duty.
2. Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 119 N.W. 458 (1909); Strawn v. Ingram,
118 W.Va. 603, 191 S.E. 401 (1937) ; Teolis v. Moscatelli, 44 R.I. 494, 119 Atl.
161 (1923); Annots., 6 A.L.R. 388 (1920), 30 A.L.R. 199 (1924), 47 A.L.R.
1092 (1927).
3. Joy v. Brown, 173 Kan. 833, 252 P.2d 889 (1953) ; Kimberly v. Ledbetter,
183 Kan. 644, 331 P.2d 307 (1958) ; Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d
217, 21 A.L.R.2d 364 (1949); see Gluckstein v. Lippsett, 209 P.2d 98 (Cal.
App. 1949) for an interesting but abortive beauty operation.
4. Boynton v. Ryan, 257 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1958); McAdams v. Windham,
208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742, 30 A.L.R. 194 (1922) ; Rauch v. Pennsylvania Sports
& Enterprises, 367 Pa. 632, 81 A.2d 548 (1951); May v. Yurek, 168 N.E. 59
(Ohio App. 1929) ; Knebel v. Jones, 266 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
Shaver v. Manziel, 347 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
5. Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) ; Jackovic v. Yocum,
212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931) ; Brennan v. Parsonnet, 82 N.J.L. 20, 83
Atl. 948 (1912).
6. Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952); Wall v. Brim, 145 F.2d
492 (5th Cir. 1944).
7. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), on rehearing 354 P.2d
670 (1960) ; Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960) ; Baldos v. Rogers,
81 So.2d 658 (1955) ; McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REv. 549 (1949).
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TRAFFIC CASES
Though the assumption of risk, as is true of other defenses
in negligence cases, first came to the surface in horse and buggy
cases," it has played a minor role in subsequent traffic cases.
One reason perhaps is that other stronger defensive doctrines
are available and focus the issues more sharply. The highway
presents so many risks to so many people, and there are so
many affirmative and defensive doctrines available for both
plaintiff and defendant that assumed risk has lost its value as
a means of allocating traffic risks. Currently its principal usage
is found most frequently in cases of host and guest. The guest
who enters an automobile is said to accept the vehicle as it is
unless the host knows of some defect not apparent and not
appreciated by the guest.9 Likewise the guest accepts the host
operator with his deficiencies, if known. 10 But at common law
the acceptance of the vehicle or the host is a lame defense if
the host is in fact negligent in his operation of the vehicle."
The guest statutes relieve the operator of liability unless his
conduct rises to the level of gross, wanton or wilful negligence
or some such standard of conduct.12 It can be said in these
cases that the duty of the operator is relaxed or that the risks
incident to mere negligence are assumed by the guest, or that
in case the guest accepts the invitation of an incompetent, in-
experienced, intoxicated or reckless operator, or fails to leave
the vehicle when the operator's condition or conduct becomes
known, the guest is contributorily negligent.'3 The cases are
legion and wide disparity exists in the disposition made of them.
8. Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685 (nisi prius 1798). Incidentally in Clay v.
Wood, 5 Esp. 44, 170 Eng. Rep. 432 (K.B. 1803) (wilful and wanton conduct) ;
Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60 (1809) (contributory negligence) ; and
Flower v. Adam, 2 Taunton's Rep. 314 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1810) (ac-
cident, proximate cause), any one of the several defenses of negligence law
sprouted in these cases could have been substituted for any one of the others
without doctrinal violence. It may also be remarked that today probably in no
one of the cases would the decision be the same.
9. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930) ; Bugh v. Webb,
328 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. 1959).
10. Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929); Eisenhut v.
Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 248 N.W. 440, 91 A.L.R. 549 (1933). Cf. Bohnsack v.
Driftmier, 243 Iowa 283, 52 N.W.2d 79 (1952) ; Hendren v. Hill, 131 Neb. 163,
267 N.W. 340 (1936).
11. Note 10 supra.
12. See Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56 (Ore. 1960) for valiant effort
by Judge O'Connell to bring order out of chaos. How well did he succeed? See
the aftermath in Burghardt v. Olson, 354 P.2d 871 (1960).
13. Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952) ; Sargent v. Wil-
liams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S.W.2d 787 (1953) ; Cheek v. Fuller, 322 S.W.2d 233
(Tenn. 1958).
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Contributory negligence is the defensive doctrine most employed
in these cases 14 though variations of the proximate cause doc-
trine are not infrequently employed. Assumed risk is given little
play.15 The other doctrines are more flexible, are more easily
dealt with as jury issues, yet still permit the court to exercise
its power decisively if the facts so warrant. Assuming a duty
on a defendant's part in a traffic case, the victim can always
be held contributorily negligent for taking the risk but, of
course, if there is no duty or violation of duty no other defense
is needed.
MANUFACTURER AND SUPPLIER CASES
The assumed risk doctrine is occasionally employed as a
defense by the manufacturer or supplier in cases involving de-
fective products or failure to give adequate warning of dangers
incident to a product's use.16 Assuming a duty and its violation,
the liability of the manufacturer or supplier is usually strict
whether based on negligence or on some theory of warranty. 17
Nevertheless the victim's own conduct may be a defense, but
usually it is resolved into an issue of contributory negligence
with the burden on the defendant to support the issue, and with
its determination for a jury.' In very clear cases a court
may take the issue from the jury and when such is done may
rationalize its decison on the basis of assumed risk.1 9 Actually
there seems to be little if any difference between the two doc-
trines in these cases. Of course if there is no duty owed the
victim as to the risk incurred, or no violation of the duty, then
the victim necessarily assumes the risk of making use of the
product. Here again both the broad concept of assumed risk and
14. Lessen v. Allison, 25 Ill. App. 2d 395, 166 N.E.2d 806 (1960) ; Mascarenas
v. Johnson, 280 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1960).
15. Bugh v. Webb, 328 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. 1959) ; Hendren v. Hill, 131 Neb.
163 (1936) ; Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 52 N.W.2d 79 (1952) ; Nygren v. American
Boat Cartage, Inc., 290 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1961).
16. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) ; Messina v. Clark
Equipment Co. 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Note, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 342
(1960) ; Davis, A Re-examination of the Doctrine of McPherson v. Buick, Etc.,
24 FORDHAM L. REV. 204 (1955).
17. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) ; Peterson
v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960) ; Spence v. Three Rivers Building
& Masonry Supply Co., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) ; Huberly v.
Reardon Co., 317 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958). See Symposium, James, Green, Plant,
Lucey and Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 923-1018
(1957) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Manufacturers' Liability), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
18. Luneau v. Elmwood Gardens, Inc., 198 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1960).
19. Robbins v. Milner Enterprise, Inc., 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960).
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its residuary doctrine are usually more adequately expressed by
other doctrinal terminology.
LANDOWNER CASES
Assumed risk has had its most extensive usage in two very
closely related groups of cases, namely, the landowner and
master-servant cases. Historically assumed risk was basic to
the immunities of both landowner and master until well into
the nineteenth century, but it did not crystallize into a doctrinal
defense before that time. At orthodox common law any person
who came on another's land took the premises as they were in
absence of some trap set for him.20 This was true as to visitors
of any class and also as to servants. In fact visitors were
analogized to servants and no distinction as to the condition
of premises was made between domestic and other servants. 2
1
During the middle 1800's this complete immunity was modified
as to landowners and as to masters, but very slightly until late
in the century.
The immunity of the landowner was modified through cate-
gories of trespasser, licensee and invitee. The landowner owed
the trespasser no duty as to the conditon of the premises. The
trespasser assumed all risks incident to his entry. This is still
stated as good law, 22 though the trespasser category has been
greatly modified in recent years as to infant trespassers and in
extreme cases even as to adults. 23 This modification was first
made by treating certain trespassers as implied licensees or
invitees to whom a duty to warn of hidden dangers was imposed
on the landowner, or in case of children to use reasonable care
to protect them against the dangers of attractive premises to
which the landowner either knew or should have known they
would come.24 It is enough to say here that thousands of cases
have been decided on the basis of these categories and their
20. Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 Barn. and Ald. 308 (1820) ; Howland v. Vincent, 51
Mass. 371 (1845) ; Foley v. H. F. Farnham Co., 135 Me. 29, 188 Atl. 708 (1936);
Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 AtI. 858 (1911).
21. Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 250 (1856) ; See Hawkins v. Coulsdon
and Purley Urban District Council, (C.A. 1953) 1 All Eng. Rep. 97 (1954) for
historical development.
22. Foley v. H. F. Farnham Co., 135 Me. 29, 188 Atl. 708 (1936).
23. Gimmestad v. Rose Brothers Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935)
Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955) ; Ehret v. Vil-
lage of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198, 199 N.E. 56 (1935) ; Brock v. Peabody Co-op
Equity Exchange, 352 P.2d 37 (Kan. 1960).
24. Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 1
(1948).
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doctrinal refinements with slight uniformity in the use of doc-
trine or in decision.
25
It is worthy of emphasis that in nearly all landowner cases
the cases turn on a consideration of defendant's duty rather
than upon the concept of assumed risks, though the latter are
always in the background. The assumption of risks by the tres-
passer is seldom adverted to. 26 The licensee and invitee cate-
gories have become so blurred that frequently no line can be
drawn between the two except as a court makes use of one or
the other to support some decision it considers just on the
peculiar facts of the case.27 One facet of the licensee doctrine
is still maintained by many courts. A house servant or social
guest still takes the premises as they are unless the danger is
hidden and no warning given. 28 The severest modification of
this nineteenth century anachronism is found in the resort to
some affirmative negligence on the part of the landowner after
the presence of the victim is known. 29 Moreover as house serv-
ants tend to become regarded as industrial employees they are
more and more treated as of the latter group and the land-
owner's immunity correspondingly broadened. But the social
guest is still a sort of tolerated intruder in his friend's house.
Time and the law have simply passed him by.
MASTER-SERVANT CASES
The development of master-servant law followed closely the
development of the landowner immunities. In the celebrated case
of Priestly v. Fowler,"° Lord Abinger's whole argument is based
on the householder's immunity. The industrial servant as a
part of his contract of service was held to assume all the risks
of the conduct of his fellow servants, the other risks of the enter-
prise as well as of his own contributory negligence. Some courts
25. See King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98 (Cal. 1959); Mayer, Ad'm. v. Temple
Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954).
26. See Gomes v. Byrne, 333 P.2d 754 (Cal. 1959). CI. Paris v. Howard
Johnson Co., 166 N.E.2d 735 (Mass. 1960).
27. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); Wolfson v.
Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1956) ; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507,
235 S.W.2d 609 (1951); Harkins v. Coulsdon, Etc., (C.A. 1953) 1 All Eng.
Rep. 97, 55 A.L.R.2d 525 (1954); Murdock v. Peterson, 74 Nev. 363, 332 P.2d
649 (1958).
28. Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834, 12 A.L.R. 982 (1921)
Annot., Liability for Injury to Social Guests, 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1923).
29. Tesone v. Reiman, 255 P.2d 48 (Cal. App. 1953) ; Brigman v. Fiske-
Carter Const. Co., 192 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125, 49 A.L.R. 773 (1926).
30. 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. 1837).
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still hold that assumed risk is restricted to the master-servant
relation, but the same courts may resort to the volenti non fit
injuria doctrine which is the same concept expressed in Latin
terminology3 1 Here again it is enough to say that the immuni-
ties of the employer were modified by duties imposed upon him
by the courts during the remainder of the 1800's with deliberate
delay. Workmen's compensation and other legislative acts have
removed the immunities for nearly all industrial employees. For
employees outside the coverage of legislation the earlier common
law doctrines have been modified by most courts but other courts
not infrequently revert to nineteenth century type with harsh
results.3 2
A good example of this tenacity of the doctrinal obsession
of the defenses in master-servant cases is found in the cases
arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Act at
first provided that contributory negligence of the employee
should only be considered in diminution of damages. For many
years defendants with approval of the courts converted con-
tributory negligence into, assumed risk.' Congress eventually
responded by abolishing assumed risks as a defense. Defendants
with court approval then converted contributory negligence
and assumed risks into issues of proximate cause, sole cause,
and other causation doctrines. The Supreme Court put an end
to this practice.3 3 The insufficiency of evidence and state prac-
tices were then resorted to in order to escape the Act and when
the Court closed these escapes both defendants and lower courts
fell back on acid criticism which apparently is weakening the
Court in its favorable disposition towards the Act.3 4
SLIP AND FALL AND CONTRACTOR CASES
Currently the most usual employment of the assumed risk
defense is bound in two types of cases.35 First, the slip and fall
31. See Robert E. McKee, General Contractor, Inc. v. Patterson, 153 Tex.
517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954) ; PROSSER, TORTS 304, n. 86 (2d ed. 1955).
32. See Bogart v. Hester, 347 P.2d 327 (N.M. 1959) for good example. Also,
Burton Const. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Broussard, 154 Tex. 50, 273 S.W.2d 598 (1955)
(discharged employee) ; Blackmore v. Auer, 357 P.2d 765 (Kan. 1950) ; Ritter
v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080 (Ore. 1961).
33. This story is better told in my article, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black,
65 YALE L. J. 482, 488 et seq. (1956).
34. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959), Appendix to
Opinion of Douglas, J., for list of cases and dissents; Davis v. Virginian Ry.
Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 387 (1960).
35. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEXAS L. REv.
562 (1942) ; Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100
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cases; second, suits against owners, suppliers, or general con-
tractors by an employee of a sub-contractor. The slip and fall
cases usually involve shopkeepers and customers. The duty of
the shopkeeper is high even though expressed only in terms of
ordinary care. 86 Most of the cases for plaintiffs fail because
no negligence can be shown on the part of the shopkeeper. Now
and then it appears that though the shopkeeper was negligent,
the customer knew the situation confronting him and proceeded
to incur the danger. It would seem that contributory negligence
would be the most apposite defense in these cases as the victim
can be held negligent for taking the risk.87 Courts are some-
times inclined to take the case into their own hands and direct
a verdict or grant judgment n.o.v. They can, of course, do this
on the basis of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but
now and then a court prefers to base its judgment on assumption
of risk.38 This is done on the basis that if the danger is open
and obvious the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty. This is
incompatible with good theory if in fact there was a duty to
make the premises reasonably safe for the customer and the
shopkeeper negligently failed to do so. In such a case the victim's
conduct was simply contributing. It seems a contradiction in
terms to say the shopkeeper owed the plaintiff no duty. 9 Never-
theless some courts prefer to express their decision in terms of
no duty and assumption of risk. It is believed they do so in
order to escape criticism for taking the contributory negligence
issue away from the jury and thus invading the jury's function.
Doctrinal semanticism serves their psychological reaction.
The third party cases are more of a puzzle. In most situa-
tions the employee has workmen's compensation from his em-
U. PA. L. REv. 629 (1952); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YATE L. J. 141
(1952).
36. Dissent of Terrell, J., in Carl's Markets, Inc. v. De Feo, 55 So.2d 182
(Fla. 1951); Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Pogue
v. A. & P., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Chapman v. Parking, Inc., 329 S.W.2d
439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
37. See cases attempting to distinguish assumption of risk and contributory
negligence: Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590, 313 P.2d 227, 63 A.L.R.2d 175
(1957); Taylor v. Hostetler, 352 Kan. 1042 (1960) ; Ferguson v. Smith, 257
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Jasper v. City and County of Denver, 354 P.2d 1028
(Colo. 1960) (city street) ; Hartley v. Tacoma School District, 354 P.2d 897
(Wash. 1960) (sidewalk).
38. Grover v. Ownes, 353 P.2d 254 (Ore. 1960) (highly questionable) ; Hunn
v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937) ; Pieraccini v. Cren-
shaw, 204 Tenn. 327, 321 S.W.2d 546 (1959).
39. Camp v. J. H. Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413 (Tex, Civ. App. 1952).
See Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L.
REv. 61 (1945).
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ployer and his insurance carrier has a deep interest by way of
subrogation in the victim's pursuing his common law action
against the general contractor or supplier or in some cases the
owner or occupier of the premises. The usual grounds in such
an action is the failure to warn of the dangers or to provide a
reasonably safe place to work or reasonably safe instrumentality
or properly superintend the over-all work of sub-contractors and
their employees. 40
A workman expert in doing highly dangerous work and em-
ployed for such purpose cannot complain that the owner or
contractor did not warn him of the danger or provide a safe
place to work. He is hired for the very purpose of doing a
dangerous job.41 Where the work is known to be dangerous by
the owner or general contractor, and a contractor is hired to
do the job, what duty is owed by the owner or general con-
tractor to the employees of the contractor hired to do the job?
Is it enough that he knows or is informed of the danger? Is
the owner or general contractor relieved of his duty to warn
the employee who does the work if his employer knows of the
danger? Courts have held both for and against the injured em-
ployee. 42 Either the employee must take the risk that his
employer will give him warning or it must fall on the owner
or general contractor. The problem is usually doctrinally ration-
alized on the basis of duty or no duty. This of course determines
who must bear the risk. But why? The cases that put the risk
upon the employee seemingly are governed by the nineteenth
century attitude towards workmen. Moreover, even when a
landowner is involved it would seem that the invitee doctrine
40. Robert E. McKee, General Contractor, Inc. v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517,
271 S.W.2d 391 (1954) ; Rittenberry v. Robert E. McKee, General Contractor,
Inc., 337 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) ; Chartier v. Winslow Crane Service
Co., 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960) ; Florez v. Groom Development Co., 348 P.2d
200 (Cal. 1959) ; Boerio v. Haiss Motor Trucking Co., 181 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App.
Div. 1959) ; Dougherty v. Chas. H. Tompkins Co., 240 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ;
Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins,
276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn.
1959) ; Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Brooks, 319 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959), reversed 336 S.W.2d 603 (1960) on basis of no negligence shown;
Koenig v. Patrick Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133, 10 A.L.R.2d 848
(1948) (statute; contributory negligence no defense) ; Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1384
(1924).
41. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951)
(doubtful that facts support decision, but see cases cited in opinion).
42. Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960), especially illuminating dissent of Brown, J.;
Lechman v. Hooper, 52 N.J.L. 253, 19 Atl. 215 (1890) ; Stevens v. United Gas
& Electric Co., 73 N.H. 159, 60 Atl. 848 (1905).
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is out of place. The employer's obligations under modern law
would seem more apposite, and the duty to provide a safe place
to work and to warn of danger non-delegable. The independent
contractor doctrine confers no immunity in such a case.43
Another situation involves the creation of a danger by the
owner, supplier, or general contractor for the employee of a
sub-contractor or the failure to make proper provision for pro-
tection against dangers created by other sub-contractors and
their employees. 44 The danger may be apparent to the injured
employee. May he proceed or must he refuse to proceed and
incur the danger? Who must take the risk in this situation?
Some courts relying on the landowner cases hold that the gen-
eral contractor is under no duty to warn the employee and im-
pose the risk upon the workman. Clearly there would be no
duty to warn in such a case, but it can hardly be said that there
is no duty to provide a safe place to work. The landowner
analogy is misleading. The contractor is not a landowner, but
is an employer with an independent contractor interposed.
Nevertheless some courts impose the dangers upon the work-
man if they are open and obvious. They give him no benefit of
the urgency of the construction; no benefit of the possible loss
of a job and its economic consequences for him and his family;
no benefit of the complexity of modern construction jobs. The
courts again hark back to the status of the employee during the
1800's and early 1900's as disclosed by the decisions of those
by-gone eras. They usually resort to the doctrine of assumed
risk but may also hold the employee contributorily negligent.
It may be that the decisive motivation of the court is the struggle
between one insurance carrier to shift its burden to another
carrier and thereby obtain a free ride. This may also be rein-
forced by the idea that recovery of workmen's compensation
from the employer is enough even though the law permits an
independent common law suit against the general contractor.
Whatever the motivation there is doctrine available for either
conclusion though it be doctrine taken over from an entirely
different social and economic as well as legal environment.
In McKee v. Patterson,4 5 defendant general contractor for
43. Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N.Y. 357, 130 N.E. 577, 23 A.L.R. 1081
(1921).
44. Roosth & Genecov Production Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 s.W.2d
99 (1953) ; Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425, 20 A.L.R.2d 853(1950).
45. Supra n. 40.
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a gymnasium called off the fixture sub-contractor to permit
the floor finishing sub-contractor to do the floors. After the
floors were finished the fixture crew returned to work and
plaintiff, an employee, fell from a ladder which slipped while
he was on it about his work. He sued the general contractor,
and the trial court with a jury found the general contractor
was negligent in not providing a safe place to work and that
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in mounting the ladder
on the polished floors. Its judgment was affirmed by the court
of civil appeals. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judg-
ment for the defendant holding that defendant owed plaintiff
no duty to warn him of the obvious dangers and that defendant
breached no duty to the plaintiff. It also rejected the theory of
contributory negligence as controlling the case.
The Supreme Court could draw no distinction between as-
sumed risk and its Latin translation volenti non fit injuria. It
stated the general contractor's duty to be the same as that of
a landowner and hence no duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers even to a person invited on the premises. The court
glided over an employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe
place to work. Had it considered the case as an employer-
employee situation rather than that of a landowner and visitor
it could never have said that the general contractor owed the
plaintiff no duty or that it breached no duty owed him. The
court could have reached the same result by holding plaintiff
contributorily negligent for taking such a risk, but this would
have meant repudiating the verdict of the jury and the judg-
ments of both courts below and that may have seemed too
drastic.4 8
Two or three observations may be made. First, the court was
led astray by the landowner analogy. The assumed risk im-
munity limiting a landowner's duty to an invitee has come to
be much broader than that of the employer to an employee.
Since the assumption of risk defense is always relative to the
particular duty of the defendant, it is highly important to ex-
amine the duty in every case. This is especially true when a
defendant may owe more than one duty. Second, in substituting
assumed risk for contributory negligence the court did violence
46. See Rittenberry v. Robert E. McKee General Contractors, Inc., 337 S.W.2d
197 (Tex. 1960) in which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter
of law was also held to defeat him.
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to legal theory. It had to hold that there was no duty owed
plaintiff and also no breach of duty; otherwise it would have
faced the issue of contributory negligence. Third, in refusing
to recognize the economic pressure on plaintiff to take the risk
as an incident of his job - a rush job it was - the court was
forced to go back to decisions made by the Texas and English
courts prior to 1900 - cases long ago passed by as reflecting
the doctrines which govern current industrial employer-employee
cases.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that no definitive meaning can be given any
one of the basic defensive doctrinal terms available in a negli-
gence case which will exclude all the others and that can be
used by lawyers and judges with semantic accuracy. The ease
of convertibility of one defense into some other makes the choice
of defensive theory largely a matter of professional taste. The
best usage is the one that most sharply focuses the defensive
facts. Assumed risk is usually too blunt and too comprehensive
to serve such a function in a highly developed adversary process.
But when nothing better is within reach of the advocate or
judge there is no good reason why he should not make use of the
term if he thinks it serves the purpose of reaching a just judg-
ment.
4 7
47. Botter v. Brittan, 286 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Pouliot v. Black, 170
N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1960).
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